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The futu
reins
It has been-said that
insurance is the last of the
financial services to accept
radical change . I Yet there
has been a fundamental
shift in the geographical
location and in the
organization of the
reinsurance industry in the
last six ears .2 Global
environmental risks are
partly responsible for this
change . Increased weather
volatilit, and catastrophic
risks are difficult to
diversify using traditional
insurance practices .
o'
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To provide a map to the future, we,
need a realistic appraisal of how we
got where we are . This is the story of
how humans have hedged risks . There
are two basic and distinct approaches :
statistical and economic . The former
is typical of the insurance industry ;
the latter typifies the securities
industry. Both are needed to manage
today's catastrophic risks . Neither
alone will do . I will show below how a
combination of both leads to efficient
outcomes, and is the way to the
future .'
Hedging unknown catastrophic
risks requires a blend of skills from the
securities and the insurance industries .
By tapping large and liquid capital
markets, reinsurers will be better able
to deal with correlated, catastrophic
risks . At the end the intelligent,
customized use of derivatives and
technology will separate the winners
from the losers .
globa
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Global environmental risks
Weather volatility has made
catastrophic risks highly
unpredictable . Many scientists believe
that climate change could be the
source. A recent report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), charged by
governments with investigating global
warming, says that humans have a
"discernible" influence on global
climate . In May 1996 insurance
executives confronted the energy
industry over global warming, and
took their case to the UN Geneva
meeting on climate change in June
1996."Their case was heard, and for
the first time the US took a leading
position in supporting the developing
countries' calls for hard targets on the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
in the industrial countries .
Environmental markets which trade
the countries' rights to emit have
been proposed and loom large on the
horizon .'
Financial risks
Although the data on climate change
is not conclusive, the financial
challenge is already real . In the last
few years the property/casualty
insurance industry has experienced
record claims of about $43 billion
connected with climate volatility. In
the United States alone there was the
1988 Midwest drought, the 1993
Midwest floods and 1995 flooding
along the California Coast . Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 produced . about $18
billion of insured losses, and total
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Aggregate Market Capacity
1990 1991 19921989
Composite of 14 programs placed by Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc .
Values indicate placed market capacity;
authorized market capacity may have been higher
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losses greater than $25 billion .'
Andrew was the most devastating
natural catastrophe ever recorded . It
also led to a wave of financial
catastrophe : the hurricane affected
almost every insurance company in
the US . No matter how hard
reinsurers tried to diversify their
portfolios among different insurance
companies, they sustained losses on
virtually every account . Not knowing
how to hedge unpredictable risks adds
the risk of financial catastrophe on
top of that of the natural catastrophe,
a one-two punch that could lead to a
social debacle . The year after Andrew
38 non-US and eight US reinsurers,
with names as familiar as Continental
Re and New England Re, either
withdrew from the business or ceased
underwriting catastrophe reinsurance .'
Reinsurers leave and prices rise
Facing an impossible challenge, many
reinsurers left the market. Worldwide
reinsurance capacity dropped more
than 30% between 1989 and 1993,
over 20% of which was due to
Andrew, see figure 1 . This naturally
led to changes in the marketplace .
Insurance companies could not buy
enough catastrophe reinsurance, no
matter how hard they tried (see figure
2 for placement shortfall percentages) .
As supply dried up, prices, of course,
increased dramatically : the rate on
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line went from 8 .2% in 1989 to
21 .4% in 1994, see figure 3 .
Higher prices then attracted new
capital . This led to a major
geographical shift of the industry
illustrated in figure 4 . The continuing
doubts of the future existence of
Lloyd's of London led to a drop in the
UK market share, from about 56% in
1989 to 23% in 1995 . Since 1993
Bermuda's reinsurance industry
evolved from practically zero to its
current position of 25% of the market .
Investment banks are now betting
heavily on the reinsurance market.
They are the owners of most newly
created businesses since 1992 .
Revolution in global finance
Together with the geographical shift
there has been a substantial shift in
the industry's strategy. Insurance
derivatives have been recommended
for several years and are starting to
emerge and play a role . In 1992 we
recommended the creation of an
instrument to bet on the frequencies
of catastrophes,' which the Chicago
Board ofTrade (CBOT) introduced
under the name Catastrophe Futures
in 1993 . This year .Morgan Stanley
started marketing a similar
instrument : a bond issue whose
returns are linked to hurricane
frequency and severity in the current
US season .' Last week Merrill Lynch
structured a transaction for USAA,
the country's largest direct marketer of
home and car insurance, offering $500
million in bonds on the US capital
markers which are tied to the
company's losses from hurricanes."
Financial innovation in reinsurance
markets is slowly taking shape, but the
pace is relentless . Everyone knows
that access to more liquid capital
markets is essential to the reinsurance
industry. The derivatives market is the
key to liquid and flexible trading of
weather risks .
With the influx of newcomers the
reinsurance industry is facing today
heightened competition and
consolidation after five years of heady
revenue growth and strong earnings .
Technology has become more
important than ever, as the new
derivative instruments require swift
and controlled action . Technology is
needed to face the challenge of
unknown risks .
Unknown risks
What are unknown risks? These are
risks whose frequencies we do not
know, and for which we are aware of
our ignorance ." You could think of
these as risks for which we have more
than one actuarial table, each equally
likely . There is more than one prior
estimate of the frequency of the
event . `Z
Example ofunknown risks are
environmental health risks of new
and little known epidemics ; risks
induced by scientific uncertainty in
predicting the frequency and severity
of catastrophic events, such as nuclear
reactor and satellite risks . These risks
are driving major changes in the
insurance and reinsurance industry
today."
Take a simple example. One
reliable source gives a 2% annual
chance of the occurrence of a
hurricane of a certain type, and
another a 12% chance . Montecarlo
simulations and other procedures can
be used to attempt to tease from all
models a unique statistical
approximation to the true frequency.
But what if there is no true frequency?
How could this be? Easily. There
may be two possible climate patterns,
both equally likely.
Indeed, many climate experts view
climate as a fundamentally non-linear
phenomenon in which chaotic
patterns emerge easily. Such systems
can have two "attractors," or two
distinct overall patterns of behavior,
each equally likely. Each of these
attractors describes a weather pattern,
a reasonable statistical inference of
the frequencies of major events . In
such a chaotic system, it is
scientifically impossible to predict
from the initial conditions which of
the two patterns the climate will
result : a pattern with two hurricanes a
year, or the other with a dozen.
The first statistical reaction is to
construct a new actuarial table by
taking an average, in this case 7 . But
taking an average does not help . It
only ensures that one is wrong 100%
of the time : 50% of the time one is
overinsured (tlie pattern with two
hurricanes per year) and the other
50% underinsured (the pattern with a
dozen a year) . Both have major
financial costs . In our case, if each
hurricane leads to $2 billion in losses,
then the averaging method leads to a
$10 billion shortfall 50% of the time
and $10 billion overinsurance the
other 50% of the time . Hardly a
considered way to manage risks .
Is there a solution to this problem?
The good news is that there is . It is
possible to hedge such unknown risks
successfully and efficiently. To do so,
however, one needs a careful and
customized approach which blends in
both insurance and securities
	
t
approaches to hedging risks .
Two ways to hedge risk
Insurance : the statistical approach
The statistical approach to hedging
risks relies on the law of large
numbers and is the traditional
foundation of the insurance industry .
For this to work, risks must be
reasonably independent across
individuals or groups, and the
frequencies must be known . Loss of
life and car accidents are typical
examples. Here the law of large
numbers operates .
There is safety in numbers : with a
large enough population the number
of those likely to be affected is known
with considerable accuracy. The
sample mean is highly predictable if
the distribution for each person or
group is known. This is the standard
principle on which insurance
operates . Reinsurance is simply a way
to augment the pool of those affected
so that the law of large numbers
operates better. All this is needed is a
reliable actuarial table describing the
incidence per person or group, and a
large pool of insureds to distribute the
risk."
If the numbers are not large
enough, it is standard to spread risk
through time . The number of people
affected by a hurricane over a 10 years
period is at least 10 times that
affected in one year. This requires that
the risks be independent through
time, eliminating irreversible risks
such as a once-and-for-all shifts
arising from global warming .
Hurricanes such as Andrew (1992)
and Opal (1995), however, defy the
law of large numbers . They affect
large areas all at once, both in
Fig. 2
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and the amount of coverage available in the market
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physical and in financial terms, and
their frequency and severity seems to
be changing . The actuarial table itself
has become the risk. Insurance does
not work . What are the alternatives?
Derivatives : the economic approach
The alternative is the economic
approach . This works best for
correlated risks, in which the same
event occurs for many people all at
once . A drop in the value of the,
dollar is an example: the event is the
same for everyone in the US
economy. There is no way to pool this
risk : however, as we all know, we can
hedge it by using derivatives
(currency futures or options) . The
Fig . 4
56.0 °/x,
1989
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principle used here is negative
correlation . One hedges by taking a
position which is highly correlated
with the risk, only with the opposite
sign .
For example, an investor with a
dollar based portfolio who fears a drop
in the value of the dollar can buyca
future contract in yen, or a dollar put.
If the dollar drops in value he is
covered by the increase in the value
of the derivative . Bear funds have
been constructed on this principle.
The economic procedure is
radically different from the insurance
approach in that it does not require a
large number of people . Nor does it
require knowing the frequency of the
Market Share by Region
25.0%,
Composite of 14 programs placed by Guy Carpenter & Co ., Inc.
23.0%d
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event or the actuarial table . This
fundamentally different method is the
way the securities industry operates .
Instead of pooling risks, one trades
risks .
Securities markets are, however,
notoriously complex. For example the
procedure of trading risks just outlined
makes no sense for individual risks,
such as death. How to describe the
death of one single person within a
large economy as one event on which
all of us can trade? To do so would
require an unrealistically high number
of securities, indeed 2`, where x is the
number of people in the economy. In
a world with five billion people the
number of securities could exceed the
number of all known particles in the
universe .
Insurance, instead, deals with such
risks expeditiously: if all individuals
are in the same risks class, one
insurance contract would suffice . The
contrast is stark, but it makes a point.
In a world of unknown risks neither
securities nor insurance methods work
in isolation .
The ideal hedge: catastrophe bundles
We saw that insurance does not work
when the frequency of a risk is
unknown, and securities do not work
when the risks are individual . Neither
of these two approaches works on
their own, then, what does work?
The ideal hedge is a combination
21 .0%
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of insurance and securities : this can
achieve efficient allocation of risk
bearing . I call this a catastrophe
bundle because it bundles up two
types of instruments . It consists of a
modified insurance instrument, which
provides insurance contingent on the
frequency as observed after the fact,
and of a novel derivative security for
betting on the frequency itself."
The latter type of security has
emerged and is now traded in the
CBOT as mentioned above related
securities have recently emerged also
in the form of bonds floated by
Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch.
The insurance instrument required
is a modified version of mutual
insurance . It differs fundamentally
from the standard mutual insurance in
that a large pool of insureds is
unnecessary.
The combination of both
instruments ensures that no financial
catastrophe will occur, since the
reinsurer is not exposed to more risks
than it can afford . Yet this approach
can be used to provide nearly full
coverage for the insured.
Elsewhere I have shown that such
instruments lead to an efficient
allocation of risk bearing." They
require a carefully customized
approach to hedging risk . This gives
the traditional face-to-face insurance
approach an edge over raw
technology.
How do catastrophe bundles work?
The instrument works best in the
hands of an experienced reinsurer or
broker who can customize it to his or
her client's needs . In a way, the
reinsurer is selling a package which
consists of insurance, a security and a
risk management/consultancy tool .
Together with the client one must
first identify the set of possible
descriptions of the risk . This part of
the process is crucial and it involves
new techniques of risks management .
This is best handled in a face-to-face
and customized basis . A mathematical
formula is then brought to bear in the
customization of catastrophe bundles
to the customer needs . This formula
works very well when there is more
than one pattern of risk and therefore
more than one "possible" actuarial
table, each table being substantially
likely. After this is achieved,
introduce derivative securities whose
payoffs depend on which description
of the risk is correct, which are
effectively transfers contingent on
distributions . Finally one structures
insurance contracts which establish a
compensation arrangement in a way
that depends on which description of
the risk is correct. These contracts
have a lot in common with old
fashioned off-track betting on `bookie'
shops .
Pricing and optimal portfolios
Fund managers can look at the flip
side of this picture and seek a
combination of insurance and
securities which offers an optimal
portfolio in insurance and investment
markets . A part of this instrument is
what Merrill Lynch and Morgan
Stanley floated recently. Securitizing
such instruments is, of course, the
next step .
Through the use of catastrophe
bundles, the reinsurance broker can
access a large pool of managed funds
while offering its clients a customized
reinsurance service which manages
risks optimally, and at very
competitive prices .
Pricing is, of course, a crucial
issue . What is needed here is to
separate two parts of the risk and push
each as far as they will go . The
contingent insurance part of the
instrument should be applied as far as
possible, covering the independent
part of the risk for which it is
optimally suited . Securities are then
used for what they are best: the
correlated part of the risk . A
mathematical formula used to
construct the catastrophe bundle
separates and prices both parts .
Convergence of insurance and
securities markets
It is no secret that the securities
industry is making inroads into the
reinsurance business . By itself,
however, it cannot succeed, because
the individual parts of the risks
cannot be handled efficiently by
securities markets : they are too
cumbersome for individual risks .
Insurance, based on the law of large
numbers, has an important place in
simplifying financial transactions and
hedging known individual risks .
Catastrophe bundles offer one
approach to computing the limits of
each instrument, and blending them
optimally to achieve the most
competitive pricing of a catastrophe
reinsurance portfolio .
The future of the industry is in the
hands of those who achieve the
perfect balance, through integrating
derivative securities with contingent
insurance contracts, and integrating
technology with customized face-to-
face know-how. The future, I may
add, is here today.
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